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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
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    On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 1:17 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> wrote:
    > * Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
    >
    >> @@ -1495,6 +1496,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
    >>  #endif
    >>  #endif
    >>       {
    >> +             .procname       = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
    >> +             .data           = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
    >> +             .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
    >> +             .mode           = 0644,
    >> +             .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
    >> +             .extra1         = &zero,
    >> +             .extra2         = &one,
    >> +     },
    >
    > Small detail:
    >
    > Might make sense to change the .mode to 0600, to make it harder
    > for unprivileged attack code to guess whether this protection
    > (and the resulting audit warning to the administrator) is
    > enabled on a system or not.

    Sure, I have no problem with that. In addition to this change, what's
    the best next step for this patch?

    Thanks,

    -Kees

    --
    Kees Cook
    ChromeOS Security
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