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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
    On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 4:18 PM, Steven Rostedt <> wrote:
    > On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
    >> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
    >> > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs.  If no_new_privs,
    >> > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
    >> Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo"
    >> NO_NEW_PRIVS?  I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any
    >> "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch
    >> doesn't help with that.
    >> System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start
    >> privileged, so this doesn't help them either.
    > I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants to
    > run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. It
    > just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we
    > don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev.

    Interestingly, I believe this change would work for the Chromium
    setuid sandbox[1]. It uses a fancy clone trick (CLONE_FS) to start the
    process then chroot once all its dependencies are loaded. It then
    chroot()s to /proc/self/fd_info (or another empty process-specific
    directory). Of course, pid namespacing still wouldn't be there, but
    it'd be nice to have a fallback if someone doesn't want the sandboxing
    setup code to have privileges (or can only install unpriv'd code).

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      Last update: 2012-01-30 23:41    [W:2.136 / U:0.040 seconds]
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