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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Steven Rostedt <> wrote:
> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
>> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs.  If no_new_privs,
>> > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
>> Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo"
>> NO_NEW_PRIVS?  I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any
>> "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch
>> doesn't help with that.
>> System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start
>> privileged, so this doesn't help them either.
> I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants to
> run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. It
> just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we
> don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev.

True. A BPF seccomp filter that disables open, bind, connect, rename,
unlink, etc may be better, though.

(I like this patch, although I don't think it's at all essential. It
could certainly be made more flexible and more useful, but it would
get considerably more complicated in the process.)

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