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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
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On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
> On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs,
> > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
>
> Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo"
> NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any
> "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch
> doesn't help with that.
>
> System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start
> privileged, so this doesn't help them either.

I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants to
run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. It
just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we
don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev.

-- Steve





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