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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
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    On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 16:58 -0500, Colin Walters wrote:
    > On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
    > > Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs,
    > > then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.
    >
    > Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo"
    > NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any
    > "container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch
    > doesn't help with that.
    >
    > System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start
    > privileged, so this doesn't help them either.

    I thought this was all for sandboxing? If a browers (or user) wants to
    run some untrusted code, perhaps a chroot is the best way to do so. It
    just will break if it needs to access /proc or /dev. And perhaps we
    don't want untrusted code accessing /proc and /dev.

    -- Steve





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