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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
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On Mon, 2012-01-30 at 08:17 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Chroot can easily be used to subvert setuid programs. If no_new_privs,
> then setuid programs don't gain any privilege, so allow chroot.

Is this needed/desired by anyone now, or are you just using it to "demo"
NO_NEW_PRIVS? I don't see it as very useful on its own, since in any
"container"-type chroot you really want /proc and /dev, and your patch
doesn't help with that.

System daemons that do chroot for a modicum of security already start
privileged, so this doesn't help them either.





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