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SubjectRe: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 13:44, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:32 AM, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu> wrote:
>>> Like this?
>>>
>>> http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1003.3/01225.html
>>
>> I don't know the execve_nosecurity patches, so the diff makes little
>> sense to me, but yeah, I wouldn't expect it to be more than a couple
>> of lines. Exactly *how* you set the bit etc is not something I care
>> deeply about, prctl seems about as good as anything.
>>
>>> Note that there's a huge can of worms if execve is allowed but
>>> suid/sgid is not: selinux may elevate privileges on exec of pretty
>>> much anything.  (I think that this is a really awful idea, but it's in
>>> the kernel, so we're stuck with it.)
>>
>> You can do any amount of crazy things with selinux, but the other side
>> of the coin is that it would also be trivial to teach selinux about
>> this same "restricted environment" bit, and just say that a process
>> with that bit set doesn't get to match whatever selinux privilege
>> escalation rules..
>>
>> I really don't think this is just about "execve cannot do setuid". I
>> think it's about the process being marked as restricted.
>>
>> So in your patch, I think that "PR_RESTRICT_EXEC" bit is wrong. It
>> should simply be "PR_RESTRICT_ME", and be done with it, and not try to
>> artificially limit it to be some "execve feature", and more think of
>> it as a "this is a process that has *no* extra privileges at all, and
>> can never get them".
>
> execve_nosecurity was my attempt to sidestep selinux issues.  It's a
> different syscall that does all of the non-security-related things
> that execve does but does not escalate (or even change) any
> privileges.  Maybe I'll try to rework that for newer kernels as well.
> The idea is that programs that expect to run in sandboxes / chroots /
> namespaces / whatever can use it, and older programs that might
> malfunction dangerously if the semantics of execve change will just
> fail instead.

I don't see any issues with SELinux support for this feature.

Specifically, when you try to execute something in SELinux, it will
first look at the types and try to "execute" (involving a type
transition IE: security label change).

But if that fails in many cases it may still be allowed to
"execute_no_trans" (IE: regular non-privileged exec() without a
transition).

If you add this feature, it should just disable the normal "execute"
with transition path and unconditionally fall back to
"execute_no_trans".

Likewise, enabling these bits should also disable the "transition" and
"dyntransition" process access vectors, and I'm on the fence about
whether "setfscreate", etc should be allowed.

Cheers,
Kyle Moffett

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