Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo | From | Dave Hansen <> | Date | Mon, 19 Sep 2011 11:03:15 -0700 |
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On Mon, 2011-09-19 at 20:51 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote: > How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or > VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does > not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations? Isn't this > much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo > restriction?
Mixing it up just adds noise. It makes the attack somewhat more difficult, but it still leaves open the possibility that the attacker can filter out the noise somehow.
-- Dave
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