Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Sun, 3 Jul 2011 22:57:09 +0400 | | From | Vasiliy Kulikov <> | | Subject | Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks |
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On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 11:27 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > That patch is entirely insane. No way in hell will that ever get merged.
Sure, this is just an RFC :) I didn't think about proposing it as a patch as is, I tried to just show how/what checks it introduces.
> copy_to/from_user() is some of the most performance-critical code, and > runs a *lot*, often for fairly small structures (ie 'fstat()' etc). > > Adding random ad-hoc tests to it is entirely inappropriate. Doing so > unconditionally is insane.
That's why I've asked whether it makes sense to guard it with CONFIG_XXX, defaults to =n. Some distributions might think it makes sense to enable it sacrificing some speed.
Will do.
> If you seriously clean it up (that at a minimum includes things like > making it configurable using some pretty helper function that just > compiles away for all the normal cases,
Hm, it is not as simple as it looks at the first glance - even if the object size is known at the compile time (__compiletime_object_size), it might be a field of a structure, which crosses the slab object boundaries because of an overflow.
However, if interpret constants fed to copy_*_user() as equivalent to {get,put}_user() (== worry about size argument overflow only), then it might be useful here.
> if (!slab_access_ok(to, n) || !stack_access_ok(to, n))
OK :)
Thanks!
-- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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