Messages in this thread | | | From | Mike Waychison <> | Date | Thu, 14 Jul 2011 16:20:59 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow disabling of sys_iopl, sys_ioperm |
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On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 4:00 PM, Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote: >> > a) you can do this with a security module >> >> I can? How? The whole LSM approach seems intractable to me. > > It would certainly need some trivial tweaking (to be specific we'd need > to move from capable(x) to capable_syscall(x, syscall_code) for those > interfaces that mattered, but that would probably be a good thing anyway > from the point of view of beating the capability model into something more > flexible and would help stuff like SELinux as well I think.
The idea of building more obtuse logic on top of posix capabilities made me puke in my mouth :(
> > We have an underlying separation of security from the other details - we > really should keep it clean that way.
An aspect oriented approach to security is probably fine for environments where you want to allow somebody access to features.
In my case, I simply don't want these "features", which is why I took the compile time approach to turning this stuff off. I realize that these syscalls (and the /dev/port interface) are not comprehensive (I didn't say they were either). I'm happy though to take suggestions for stuff I probably should be disabling considering my goal of making it difficult for root to compromise a system. And yes, modules are disabled :) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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