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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] kernel: escape non-ASCII and control characters in printk()

    * Linus Torvalds <> wrote:

    > On Mon, Jun 27, 2011 at 11:38 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <> wrote:
    > >
    > > Sure, I don't propose it anymore (v2 goes without it).
    > What point would you like to filter things at?
    > I really think that user space should do its own filtering - nobody
    > does a plain 'cat' on dmesg. Or if they do, they really have
    > themselves to blame.
    > And afaik, we don't do any escape sequence handling at the console
    > level either, so you cannot mess up the console with control
    > characters.
    > And the most dangerous character seems to be one that you don't
    > filter: the one we really do react to is '\n', and you could possibly
    > make confusing log messages by embedding a newline in your string and
    > then trying to make the rest look like something bad (say, an oops).
    > So I'm not entirely convinced about this filtering at all.

    Yeah. It would be nice to see a demonstration of at least one 'bad
    thing' that is possible via the current code, before we protect
    against it.

    The claim the patch makes is rather specific:

    | There are numerous printk() instances with user supplied input as
    | "%s" data, and unprivileged user may craft log messages with
    | substrings containing control characters via these printk()s.
    | Control characters might fool root viewing the logs via tty, e.g.
    | using ^[1A to suppress the previous log line.

    So it ought to be demonstrable.



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