Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 3 Jun 2011 18:16:42 -0400 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v4 03/13] seccomp_filters: new mode with configurable syscall filters | From | Colin Walters <> |
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On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 4:34 PM, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote: > (Any thoughts specifically on the mutex use would be greatly appreciated!) > > This change adds a new seccomp mode which specifies the allowed system > calls dynamically.
One thing to consider (not sure if it's been discussed, but I think not) is whether some of the LSMs should hook this.
Notably, it looks like SELinux doesn't have an access vector for prctl at all now; it doesn't hook task_prctl from what I see, and so we fall back to cap_task_prctl. While I know the idea of restricting a process' ability to enter seccomp is a bit perverse, we should probably at least allow mandatory controls. James?
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