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SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot

* Dan Rosenberg <> wrote:

> Just to play devil's advocate, how is it easier for a local
> attacker to figure out where kernel internals are if it's been
> relinked vs. randomized at load time, assuming we follow through on
> fixing the info leaks?

Well, 'fixing the info leaks' will obfuscate previously useful files
such as /proc/kallsyms ...

That's one of the advantages of randomization: it allows us to expose
RIPs without them being an instant information leak.



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