Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 26 May 2011 15:09:06 -0400 | Subject | Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering | From | Eric Paris <> |
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On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 3:05 PM, <david@lang.hm> wrote: > On Thu, 26 May 2011, Ingo Molnar wrote: > >> * Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote: >> >>> It also gets rid of all configuration - one of the things that >>> makes most security frameworks (look at selinux, but also just >>> ACL's etc) such a crazy rats nest is the whole "set up for other >>> processes". If it's designed very much to be about just the "self" >>> process (after initialization etc), then I think that avoids pretty >>> much all the serious issues. >> >> That's how the event filters work currently: even when inherited they >> get removed when exec-ing a setuid task, so they cannot leak into >> privileged context and cannot modify execution there. >> >> Inheritance works when requested, covering only same-credential child >> tasks, not privileged successors. > > this is a very reasonable default, but there should be some way of saying > that you want the restrictions to carry over to the suid task (I really know > what I'm doing switch)
You mean the "i'm a hacker and want to be able to learn about tasks I shouldn't be able to learn about" switch? No. You either get out of the way on SUID or refuse to launch SUID apps. Those are the only reasonable choices.
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