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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering
    On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 3:05 PM,  <> wrote:
    > On Thu, 26 May 2011, Ingo Molnar wrote:
    >> * Linus Torvalds <> wrote:
    >>> It also gets rid of all configuration - one of the things that
    >>> makes most security frameworks (look at selinux, but also just
    >>> ACL's etc) such a crazy rats nest is the whole "set up for other
    >>> processes". If it's designed very much to be about just the "self"
    >>> process (after initialization etc), then I think that avoids pretty
    >>> much all the serious issues.
    >> That's how the event filters work currently: even when inherited they
    >> get removed when exec-ing a setuid task, so they cannot leak into
    >> privileged context and cannot modify execution there.
    >> Inheritance works when requested, covering only same-credential child
    >> tasks, not privileged successors.
    > this is a very reasonable default, but there should be some way of saying
    > that you want the restrictions to carry over to the suid task (I really know
    > what I'm doing switch)

    You mean the "i'm a hacker and want to be able to learn about tasks I
    shouldn't be able to learn about" switch? No. You either get out of
    the way on SUID or refuse to launch SUID apps. Those are the only
    reasonable choices.

     \ /
      Last update: 2011-05-26 21:11    [W:0.019 / U:6.716 seconds]
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