Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 26 May 2011 20:47:23 +0200 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering |
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* Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> It also gets rid of all configuration - one of the things that > makes most security frameworks (look at selinux, but also just > ACL's etc) such a crazy rats nest is the whole "set up for other > processes". If it's designed very much to be about just the "self" > process (after initialization etc), then I think that avoids pretty > much all the serious issues.
That's how the event filters work currently: even when inherited they get removed when exec-ing a setuid task, so they cannot leak into privileged context and cannot modify execution there.
Inheritance works when requested, covering only same-credential child tasks, not privileged successors.
Thanks,
Ingo
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