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SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] Namespace file descriptors for 2.6.40
On Mon, May 23, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<> wrote:
> This tree adds the files /proc/<pid>/ns/net, /proc/<pid>/ns/ipc,
> /proc/<pid>/ns/uts that can be opened to refer to the namespaces of a
> process at the time those files are opened, and can be bind mounted to
> keep the specified namespace alive without a process.
> This tree adds the setns system call that can be used to change the
> specified namespace of a process to the namespace specified by a system
> call.

i just have a quick question regarding these, apologies if wrong place
to respond -- i trimmed to lists only.

if i understand correctly, mount namespaces (for example), allow one
to build such constructs as "private /tmp" and similar that even
`root` cannot access ... and there are many reasons `root` does not
deserve to completely know/interact with user processes (FUSE makes a
good example ... just because i [user] have SSH access to a machine,
why should `root`?)

would these /proc additions break such guarantees? IOW, would it now
become possible for `root` to inject stuff into my private namespaces,
and/or has these guarantees never existed and i am mistaken? is there
any kind of ACL mechanism that endows the origin process (or similar)
with the ability to dictate who can hold and/or interact with these

Thanks for your time,


C Anthony

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