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Subject[RFC 9/9] MCE: Add Action-Required support
Date
From: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>

Implement core MCA recovery. This is used for errors
that happen in the current execution context.

The kernel has to first pass the error information
to a function running on the current process stack.
This is done using a new work flag and then executing
the code after the exception through do_notify_resume.

Then hwpoison is allowed to sleep and can try to recover it.

To pass the information about the error around we need
to use a field in the current process. The old ways
to handle this (per cpu buffer) don't work because
a CPU could be switched before reaching the handler code.

For kernel recovery we only handle errors happening
during copy_*_user() exception tables and inject EFAULT.
When the tolerance level is sufficiently high also
a unsafe oops like do_exit() killing, which has some
deadlock potential.

FIXME: fix 386 handling of mce notify bit in entry_32.S after mce

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c | 35 ++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/linux/init_task.h | 7 ++
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +
4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c
index 352d16a..fe8a28c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>

#include "mce-internal.h"
@@ -54,6 +55,9 @@ static struct severity {
{ .mcgmask = x, .mcgres = res, SEV(s), .msg = m, ## r }
#define MASK(x, y, s, m, r...) \
{ .mask = x, .result = y, SEV(s), .msg = m, ## r }
+#define ARMASK(x, y, s, m, r...) \
+ { .mcgmask = MCG_STATUS_RIPV, .mcgres = 0, \
+ .mask = x, .result = y, SEV(s), .msg = m, ## r }
#define MCI_UC_S (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S)
#define MCI_UC_SAR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR)
#define MCACOD 0xffff
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ static struct severity {
MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, 0, PANIC,
"Neither restart nor error IP"),
MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0, PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
- KERNEL),
+ KERNEL, NOSER),
BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC, KEEP, "Corrected error", NOSER),

/* ignore OVER for UCNA */
@@ -77,10 +81,16 @@ static struct severity {
"Illegal combination (UCNA with AR=1)", SER),
MASK(MCI_STATUS_S, 0, KEEP, "Non signalled machine check", SER),

- /* AR add known MCACODs here */
MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, PANIC,
"Action required with lost events", SER),
- MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_SAR, PANIC,
+
+ /* known AR MCACODs: */
+ ARMASK(MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_STATUS_OVER|0xffff, MCI_UC_SAR|0x134, AR,
+ "Action required: data load error", SER),
+ ARMASK(MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_STATUS_OVER|0xffff, MCI_UC_SAR|0x150, AR,
+ "Action required: instruction fetch error", SER),
+
+ ARMASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_SAR, PANIC,
"Action required; unknown MCACOD", SER),

/* known AO MCACODs: */
@@ -89,6 +99,7 @@ static struct severity {
MASK(MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCACOD, MCI_UC_S|0x17a, AO,
"Action optional: last level cache writeback error", SER),

+
MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_S, SOME,
"Action optional unknown MCACOD", SER),
MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_S|MCI_STATUS_OVER, SOME,
@@ -110,6 +121,17 @@ static int error_context(struct mce *m)
return IN_KERNEL;
}

+static int kernel_ar_recoverable(struct mce *m, int tolerant)
+{
+ if (tolerant >= 2)
+ return MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
+ if (!(m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_EIPV) || !m->ip)
+ return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ if (search_exception_tables(m->ip))
+ return MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
+ return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+}
+
int mce_severity(struct mce *a, int tolerant, char **msg)
{
enum context ctx = error_context(a);
@@ -129,9 +151,12 @@ int mce_severity(struct mce *a, int tolerant, char **msg)
if (msg)
*msg = s->msg;
s->covered = 1;
- if (s->sev >= MCE_UC_SEVERITY && ctx == IN_KERNEL) {
- if (panic_on_oops || tolerant < 1)
+ if (ctx == IN_KERNEL) {
+ if (s->sev >= MCE_UC_SEVERITY &&
+ (panic_on_oops || tolerant < 1))
return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ if (s->sev == MCE_AR_SEVERITY)
+ return kernel_ar_recoverable(a, tolerant);
}
return s->sev;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 7da4a75..9d5e679 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -960,6 +960,131 @@ static void mce_clear_state(unsigned long *toclear)
}
}

+/* Stub when hwpoison is not compiled in */
+int __attribute__((weak)) __memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int vector,
+ int precount)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Uncorrected error for current process.
+ */
+static void mce_action_required(struct mce *m, char *msg, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (!mce_usable_address(m))
+ mce_panic("No address for Action-Required Machine Check",
+ m, msg);
+ if (!(m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_EIPV))
+ mce_panic("No EIPV for Action-Required Machine Check",
+ m, msg);
+
+ WARN_ON(current->mce_error_pfn != -1L);
+ current->mce_error_pfn = m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_MCE_NOTIFY);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(x) "MCE: %s:%d " x "\n", current->comm, current->pid
+#define PADDR(x) ((u64)(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+/*
+ * No successfull recovery. Make sure at least that there's
+ * a SIGBUS.
+ */
+static void ar_fallback(struct task_struct *me, unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ if (signal_pending(me) && sigismember(&me->pending.signal, SIGBUS))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * For some reason hwpoison wasn't able to send a proper
+ * SIGBUS. Send a fallback signal. Unfortunately we don't
+ * know the virtual address here, so can't tell the program
+ * details.
+ */
+ force_sig(SIGBUS, me);
+ pr_err("Killed due to action-required memory corruption");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle action-required on the process stack. hwpoison does the
+ * bulk of the work and with some luck might even be able to fix the
+ * problem.
+ *
+ * Logic changes here should be reflected in kernel_ar_recoverable().
+ */
+static void handle_action_required(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ struct task_struct *me = current;
+ unsigned long pfn = me->mce_error_pfn;
+ unsigned long pstack;
+
+ me->mce_error_pfn = -1L;
+
+ /*
+ * User-mode:
+ *
+ * Guarantee of no kernel locks hold. Do full VM level
+ * recovery. This will result either in a signal
+ * or transparent recovery.
+ */
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ pr_err("Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at %llx",
+ PADDR(pfn));
+ if (__memory_failure(pfn, MCE_VECTOR, 0) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Memory error not recovered");
+ ar_fallback(me, pfn);
+ } else
+ pr_err("Memory error recovered");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Kernel-mode:
+ *
+ * Recover from faults with exception tables.
+ *
+ * We can't use VM recovery here, because there's no
+ * guarantee what locks are already hold in the code
+ * interrupted and we don't have a virtual address.
+ *
+ * Simply EFAULT this case.
+ */
+ pr_err("Hardware memory error in kernel context at %llx",
+ PADDR(pfn));
+ if (fixup_exception(regs)) {
+ pr_err("Injecting EFAULT for kernel memory error");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Corruption in kernel code that is not protected by
+ * a exception table.
+ *
+ * When the tolerance level is high enough treat like
+ * an oops. Note this is not fully safe and might deadlock
+ * when the current code path hold any locks taken by do_exit.
+ *
+ * Do various sanity checks to avoid looping etc.
+ */
+ pstack = (unsigned long)task_thread_info(current);
+ if (tolerant >= 2 &&
+ !(current->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
+ current->pid &&
+ !in_interrupt() &&
+ regs->sp >= pstack && regs->sp <= pstack + THREAD_SIZE) {
+ pr_err("Unsafe killing of current process in kernel context");
+ do_exit(SIGBUS);
+ }
+
+ panic("Memory error machine check in kernel context at %llx",
+ PADDR(pfn));
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(x) x
+
/*
* The actual machine check handler. This only handles real
* exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
@@ -1072,12 +1197,6 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
continue;
}

- /*
- * Kill on action required.
- */
- if (severity == MCE_AR_SEVERITY)
- kill_it = 1;
-
mce_read_aux(&m, i);

/*
@@ -1122,6 +1241,15 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
mce_panic("Fatal machine check on current CPU", &m, msg);

/*
+ * Do recovery in current process if needed. This has to be delayed
+ * until we're back on the process stack.
+ */
+ if (worst == MCE_AR_SEVERITY) {
+ mce_action_required(&m, msg, regs);
+ kill_it = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
* If the error seems to be unrecoverable, something should be
* done. Try to kill as little as possible. If we can kill just
* one task, do that. If the user has set the tolerance very
@@ -1136,6 +1264,18 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)

if (worst > 0)
mce_report_event(regs);
+
+ /*
+ * We seem to be making TIF_MCE_NOTIFY serve two purposes:
+ * 1: Get the log of this event moving
+ * 2: Don't let us return to an "Action Required" user process.
+ * But mce_report_event() may end up clearing the flag, so we
+ * set it again here if needed to stop us returning to the
+ * user code that triggered this machine check.
+ */
+ if (worst == MCE_AR_SEVERITY)
+ set_thread_flag(TIF_MCE_NOTIFY);
+
mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, 0);
out:
atomic_dec(&mce_entry);
@@ -1157,8 +1297,6 @@ void __attribute__((weak)) memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int vector)
* per CPU.
* Note we don't disable preemption, so this code might run on the wrong
* CPU. In this case the event is picked up by the scheduled work queue.
- * This is merely a fast path to expedite processing in some common
- * cases.
*/
void mce_notify_process(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -1166,6 +1304,9 @@ void mce_notify_process(struct pt_regs *regs)
mce_notify_irq();
while (mce_ring_get(&pfn))
memory_failure(pfn, MCE_VECTOR);
+
+ if (regs && current->mce_error_pfn != -1L)
+ handle_action_required(regs);
}

static void mce_process_work(struct work_struct *dummy)
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index caa151f..16ab936 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
# define INIT_PERF_EVENTS(tsk)
#endif

+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+#define INIT_MCE_ERROR_PFN .mce_error_pfn = -1L,
+#else
+#define INIT_MCE_ERROR_PFN
+#endif
+
/*
* INIT_TASK is used to set up the first task table, touch at
* your own risk!. Base=0, limit=0x1fffff (=2MB)
@@ -192,6 +198,7 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
INIT_FTRACE_GRAPH \
INIT_TRACE_RECURSION \
INIT_TASK_RCU_PREEMPT(tsk) \
+ INIT_MCE_ERROR_PFN \
}


diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 781abd1..a72f3aa 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1540,6 +1540,9 @@ struct task_struct {
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
atomic_t ptrace_bp_refcnt;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+ unsigned long mce_error_pfn;
+#endif
};

/* Future-safe accessor for struct task_struct's cpus_allowed. */
--
1.7.3.1


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