Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Thu, 19 May 2011 11:04:48 -0700 | From | Greg KH <> | Subject | [20/71] CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_options |
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2.6.38-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
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From: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
commit 4906e50b37e6f6c264e7ee4237343eb2b7f8d16d upstream.
While password processing we can get out of options array bound if the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check if we reach the end.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
--- fs/cifs/connect.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -822,8 +822,7 @@ static int cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname, struct smb_vol *vol) { - char *value; - char *data; + char *value, *data, *end; unsigned int temp_len, i, j; char separator[2]; short int override_uid = -1; @@ -866,6 +865,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, if (!options) return 1; + end = options + strlen(options); if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) { if (options[4] != 0) { separator[0] = options[4]; @@ -930,6 +930,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, the only illegal character in a password is null */ if ((value[temp_len] == 0) && + (value + temp_len < end) && (value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) { /* reinsert comma */ value[temp_len] = separator[0];
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