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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400
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    On Fri, Mar 4, 2011 at 10:37 PM, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
    > This patch makes these techniques more difficult by making it hard to
    > know whether the last attacker-allocated object resides before a free or
    > allocated object.  Especially with vulnerabilities that only allow one
    > attempt at exploitation before recovery is needed to avoid trashing too
    > much heap state and causing a crash, this could go a long way.  I'd
    > still argue in favor of removing the ability to know how many objects
    > are used in a given slab, since randomizing objects doesn't help if you
    > know every object is allocated.

    So if the attacker knows every object is allocated, how does that help
    if we're randomizing the initial freelist?
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