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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] Make /proc/slabinfo 0400
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    On Sat, Mar 5, 2011 at 12:10 AM, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> wrote:
    > I can think of four things that will make things harder for the
    > attacker (in the order of least theoretical performance impact):
    >
    >  (1) disable slub merging
    >
    >  (2) pin down random objects in the slab during setup (i.e. don't
    > allow them to be allocated)
    >
    >  (3) randomize the initial freelist
    >
    >  (4) randomize padding between objects in a slab
    >
    > AFAICT, all of them will make brute force attacks using the kernel
    > heap as an attack vector harder but won't prevent them.

    There's also a fifth one:

    (5) randomize slab page allocation order

    which will make it harder to make sure you have full control over a
    slab and figure out which allocation lands on it.

    Pekka
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