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SubjectRe: [PATCH] [RFC] Make it easier to harden /proc/
Hi Richard,

On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 08:31:47PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> When containers like LXC are used a unprivileged and jailed
> root user can still write to critical files in /proc/.
> E.g: /proc/sys/kernel/{sysrq, panic, panic_on_oops, ... }
>
> This new restricted attribute makes it possible to protect such
> files. When restricted is set to true root needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> to into the file.

I was thinking about this too. I'd prefer more fine-grained control
in this area, since some sysctl entries aren't strictly controlled by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. mmap_min_addr is already checking CAP_SYS_RAWIO).

How about this instead?

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
---
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index 8eb2522..5c5cfab 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, void __user *buf,
if (sysctl_perm(head->root, table, write ? MAY_WRITE : MAY_READ))
goto out;

+ if (write && !cap_isclear(table->write_caps) &&
+ !cap_issubset(table->write_caps, current_cred()->cap_permitted))
+ goto out;
+
/* if that can happen at all, it should be -EINVAL, not -EISDIR */
error = -EINVAL;
if (!table->proc_handler)
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index 11684d9..4e05493 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -1018,6 +1018,7 @@ struct ctl_table
void *data;
int maxlen;
mode_t mode;
+ kernel_cap_t write_caps; /* Capabilities required to write */
struct ctl_table *child;
struct ctl_table *parent; /* Automatically set */
proc_handler *proc_handler; /* Callback for text formatting */

--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team


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