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SubjectRe: [SECURITY] /proc/$pid/ leaks contents across setuid exec
On Tue, Feb 08, 2011 at 02:43:15PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Feb 2011, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Sure, I know about O_CLOEXEC, but this is about protecting the
> > just-been-execed setuid process from the attacking process that has no
> > reason to set O_CLOEXEC.
> >
> > Something like this needs to be enforced on the kernel side. I.e. these
> > file in /proc need to have O_CLOEXEC set in a way that cannot be unset.
> >
> > > Changing the behavior in the core kernel will break userspace.
> >
> > I don't think /proc/$pid/* needs to stay open across execs, does it? Or at
> > least the non-0444 files should be handled separately.
> Actually, this seems like a more general kind of bug in proc rather than a
> leaked fd. Each child task should only see its own /proc/[pid] data.

Right, that's precisely the problem. The unprivileged process can read
the setuid process's /proc files.


Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team

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