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SubjectRe: [SECURITY] /proc/$pid/ leaks contents across setuid exec
On Mon, 7 Feb 2011, Kees Cook wrote:

> $ ./ auxv,syscall /usr/bin/passwd
> running
> AT_BASE: 0x7f2828bde000
> AT_RANDOM: 0x7fff80bde7c9
> Changing password for kees.
> (current) UNIX password: 0 0x0 0x7fff80bdda90 0x1ff 0x7fff80bdd580 0x7f2828dc57c0 0x7f28287cec1d 0x7fff80bdd088 0x7f28282fe6c0
> There needs to be some way to break the connection to these files across
> the setuid exec, or perform some sort of revalidation of permissions. (Maybe
> check dumpable?)

The way to do this is to set O_CLOEXEC.


Changing the behavior in the core kernel will break userspace.

- James
James Morris

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