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SubjectRe: Using ftrace/perf as a basis for generic seccomp

* Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> wrote:

> Hi Eric,
>
> (2011/02/01 23:58), Eric Paris wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:28 PM, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> Some time ago Adam posted a patch to allow for a generic seccomp
> >> implementation (unlike the current seccomp where your choice is all
> >> syscalls or only read, write, sigreturn, and exit) which got little
> >> traction and it was suggested he instead do the same thing somehow using
> >> the tracing code:
> >> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/833556
>
> Hm, interesting idea :)
> But why would you like to use tracing code? just for hooking?

What I suggested before was to reuse the scripting engine and the tracepoints.

I.e. the "seccomp restrictions" can be implemented via a filter expression - and the
scripting engine could be generalized so that such 'sandboxing' code can make use of
it.

For example, if you want to restrict a process to only allow open() syscalls to fd 4
(a very restrictive sandbox), it could be done via this filter expression:

'fd == 4'

etc. Note that obviously the scripting engine needs to be abstracted out somewhat -
but this is the basic idea, to reuse the callbacks and reuse the scripting engine
for runtime filtering of syscall parameters.

Thanks,

Ingo


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