On Sun, Oct 02, 2011 at 12:02:33PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 10/02/2011 11:39 AM, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> > 
> > I'm not opposed to generate a second key, but I don't really understand
> > how it solves the isolation issue. I'm not used to key signing parties
> > and am presently in the situation where I don't know whom to ping to
> > sign my key. The only thing I could do was to sign it with my old key
> > as you suggested in the initial mail on the subject :-/
> > 
> > So if at least generating a second key can save that hassle for next
> > time, I'm all in favor of making it, it just takes a few seconds.
> > 
> 
> The idea is that you have a key that you keep *extremely* secure.  When
> you go to key signing parties you only bring the public key (for
> verifying the fingerprint) but you don't sign keys until you're at your
> secure host, for example.
> 
> That is the key you will use to establish yourself in the web of trust.
>  The key you will actually *use* is a child key signed with that key,
> and perhaps a handful of others.
> 
> That way, if your everyday key is compromised, you can still use your
> secure key to sign the everyday key.  This alone will get you "marginal"
> trust in the PGP web, which is good enough to get you new credentials.

OK that makes sense. Thanks for the explanation.

Willy