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    Subject[PATCH 11/13] AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initialization
    Date
    AppArmor hooks to interface with the LSM, module parameters and module
    initialization.

    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    ---
    security/apparmor/lsm.c | 939 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    1 files changed, 939 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
    create mode 100644 security/apparmor/lsm.c

    diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
    new file mode 100644
    index 0000000..b4828d7
    --- /dev/null
    +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
    @@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
    +/*
    + * AppArmor security module
    + *
    + * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
    + *
    + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
    + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
    + *
    + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
    + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
    + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
    + * License.
    + */
    +
    +#include <linux/security.h>
    +#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
    +#include <linux/mm.h>
    +#include <linux/mman.h>
    +#include <linux/mount.h>
    +#include <linux/namei.h>
    +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
    +#include <linux/ctype.h>
    +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
    +#include <linux/audit.h>
    +#include <net/sock.h>
    +
    +#include "include/apparmor.h"
    +#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
    +#include "include/audit.h"
    +#include "include/capability.h"
    +#include "include/context.h"
    +#include "include/file.h"
    +#include "include/ipc.h"
    +#include "include/path.h"
    +#include "include/policy.h"
    +#include "include/procattr.h"
    +
    +/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
    +int apparmor_initialized;
    +
    +/*
    + * LSM hook functions
    + */
    +
    +/*
    + * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
    + */
    +static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
    +{
    + aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
    + cred->security = NULL;
    +}
    +
    +/*
    + * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
    + */
    +static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
    +{
    + /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
    + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
    + if (!cxt)
    + return -ENOMEM;
    +
    + cred->security = cxt;
    + return 0;
    +}
    +
    +/*
    + * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
    + */
    +static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
    + gfp_t gfp)
    +{
    + /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
    + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
    + if (!cxt)
    + return -ENOMEM;
    +
    + aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
    + new->security = cxt;
    + return 0;
    +}
    +
    +/*
    + * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
    + */
    +static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
    +{
    + const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
    + struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
    +
    + aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
    + unsigned int mode)
    +{
    + int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
    + if (error)
    + return error;
    +
    + return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
    +{
    + int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
    + if (error)
    + return error;
    +
    + return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
    +}
    +
    +/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
    +static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
    + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
    +{
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + const struct cred *cred;
    +
    + rcu_read_lock();
    + cred = __task_cred(target);
    + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
    +
    + *effective = cred->cap_effective;
    + *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
    + *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
    +
    + if (!unconfined(profile)) {
    + *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
    + *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
    + }
    + rcu_read_unlock();
    +
    + return 0;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
    + int cap, int audit)
    +{
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
    + int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
    + if (!error) {
    + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
    + if (!unconfined(profile))
    + error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
    + }
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +/**
    + * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
    + * @op: operation being checked
    + * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
    + * @mask: requested permissions mask
    + * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
    + *
    + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
    + */
    +static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
    + struct path_cond *cond)
    +{
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + int error = 0;
    +
    + profile = __aa_current_profile();
    + if (!unconfined(profile))
    + error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
    +
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +/**
    + * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
    + * @op: operation being checked
    + * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
    + * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
    + * @mask: requested permissions mask
    + * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
    + *
    + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
    + */
    +static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
    + struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
    + struct path_cond *cond)
    +{
    + struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
    +
    + return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
    +}
    +
    +/**
    + * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
    + * @op: operation being checked
    + * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
    + * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
    + * @mask: requested permissions mask
    + *
    + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
    + */
    +static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
    + struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
    +{
    + struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
    + struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
    + dentry->d_inode->i_mode
    + };
    +
    + return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
    +}
    +
    +/**
    + * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
    + * @op: operation being checked
    + * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
    + * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
    + * @mask: requested permission mask
    + *
    + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
    + */
    +static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
    + struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
    +{
    + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
    + struct path_cond cond = { };
    +
    + if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
    + cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
    +
    + return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
    +}
    +
    +/**
    + * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
    + * @op: operation being checked
    + * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
    + * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
    + * @mask: request permission mask
    + * @mode: created file mode
    + *
    + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
    + */
    +static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
    + u32 mask, umode_t mode)
    +{
    + struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
    +
    + if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
    +{
    + return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
    + int mode)
    +{
    + return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
    + S_IFDIR);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
    +{
    + return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
    + int mode, unsigned int dev)
    +{
    + return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
    + unsigned int time_attrs)
    +{
    + struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
    + path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
    + };
    +
    + if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
    + &cond);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
    + const char *old_name)
    +{
    + return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
    + S_IFLNK);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
    + struct dentry *new_dentry)
    +{
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + int error = 0;
    +
    + if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + profile = aa_current_profile();
    + if (!unconfined(profile))
    + error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
    + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
    +{
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + int error = 0;
    +
    + if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + profile = aa_current_profile();
    + if (!unconfined(profile)) {
    + struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
    + struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
    + struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
    + old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
    + };
    +
    + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
    + MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
    + AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
    + &cond);
    + if (!error)
    + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
    + 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
    + AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
    +
    + }
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
    + mode_t mode)
    +{
    + if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
    +{
    + struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
    + path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
    + };
    +
    + if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
    +{
    + if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
    + AA_MAY_META_READ);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
    +{
    + struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + int error = 0;
    +
    + if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
    + * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
    + * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
    + * actually execute the image.
    + */
    + if (current->in_execve) {
    + fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
    + return 0;
    + }
    +
    + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
    + if (!unconfined(profile)) {
    + struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
    + struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
    +
    + error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
    + aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
    + /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
    + fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
    + }
    +
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
    +{
    + /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
    + file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
    + if (!file->f_security)
    + return -ENOMEM;
    + return 0;
    +
    +}
    +
    +static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
    +{
    + struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
    +
    + aa_free_file_context(cxt);
    +}
    +
    +static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
    +{
    + struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
    + struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
    + int error = 0;
    +
    + BUG_ON(!fprofile);
    +
    + if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
    + !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
    + return 0;
    +
    + profile = __aa_current_profile();
    +
    + /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
    + * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
    + * was granted.
    + *
    + * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
    + * delegation from unconfined tasks
    + */
    + if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
    + ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
    + error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
    +
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
    +{
    + return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
    +{
    + u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
    +
    + if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
    + mask |= MAY_WRITE;
    +
    + return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
    +}
    +
    +static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
    + unsigned long flags)
    +{
    + struct dentry *dentry;
    + int mask = 0;
    +
    + if (!file || !file->f_security)
    + return 0;
    +
    + if (prot & PROT_READ)
    + mask |= MAY_READ;
    + /*
    + * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
    + * write back to the files
    + */
    + if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
    + mask |= MAY_WRITE;
    + if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
    + mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
    +
    + dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
    + return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
    + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
    + unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
    +{
    + int rc = 0;
    +
    + /* do DAC check */
    + rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
    + if (rc || addr_only)
    + return rc;
    +
    + return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
    + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
    +{
    + return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
    + !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
    + char **value)
    +{
    + int error = -ENOENT;
    + struct aa_profile *profile;
    + /* released below */
    + const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
    + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
    + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
    +
    + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
    + error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
    + value);
    + else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
    + error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous),
    + value);
    + else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
    + error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec),
    + value);
    + else
    + error = -EINVAL;
    +
    + put_cred(cred);
    +
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
    + void *value, size_t size)
    +{
    + char *command, *args = value;
    + size_t arg_size;
    + int error;
    +
    + if (size == 0)
    + return -EINVAL;
    + /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
    + * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
    + * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
    + */
    + if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
    + if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
    + return -EINVAL;
    + args[size] = '\0';
    + }
    +
    + /* task can only write its own attributes */
    + if (current != task)
    + return -EACCES;
    +
    + args = value;
    + args = strim(args);
    + command = strsep(&args, " ");
    + if (!args)
    + return -EINVAL;
    + args = skip_spaces(args);
    + if (!*args)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
    + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
    + if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
    + error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
    + !AA_DO_TEST);
    + } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
    + error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
    + AA_DO_TEST);
    + } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
    + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
    + !AA_DO_TEST);
    + } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
    + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
    + AA_DO_TEST);
    + } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
    + error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
    + } else {
    + struct common_audit_data sa;
    + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
    + sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
    + sa.aad.info = name;
    + sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
    + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
    + &sa, NULL);
    + }
    + } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
    + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
    + !AA_DO_TEST);
    + } else {
    + /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
    + return -EINVAL;
    + }
    + if (!error)
    + error = size;
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
    + struct rlimit *new_rlim)
    +{
    + struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
    + int error = 0;
    +
    + if (!unconfined(profile))
    + error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
    +
    + return error;
    +}
    +
    +static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
    + .name = "apparmor",
    +
    + .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
    + .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
    + .capget = apparmor_capget,
    + .capable = apparmor_capable,
    +
    + .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
    + .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
    + .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
    + .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
    + .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
    + .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
    + .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
    + .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
    + .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
    + .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
    + .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open,
    + .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
    +
    + .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
    + .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
    + .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
    + .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
    + .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
    + .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
    +
    + .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
    + .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
    +
    + .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
    + .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
    + .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
    + .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
    +
    + .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
    + .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
    + .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
    + .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
    +
    + .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
    +};
    +
    +/*
    + * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
    + */
    +
    +static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
    +
    +static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
    +
    +static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
    +
    +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
    +
    +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
    +#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
    +
    +/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
    + * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
    + */
    +
    +/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
    +enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
    +module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
    + &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Debug mode */
    +int aa_g_debug;
    +module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Audit mode */
    +enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
    +module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
    + &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
    + * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
    + */
    +int aa_g_audit_header = 1;
    +module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
    + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* lock out loading/removal of policy
    + * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
    + * load policy, if lock_policy is set
    + */
    +int aa_g_lock_policy;
    +module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
    + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Syscall logging mode */
    +int aa_g_logsyscall;
    +module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
    +unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
    +module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
    + * on the loaded policy is done.
    + */
    +int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
    +module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
    + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
    +
    +/* Boot time disable flag */
    +static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
    +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
    +
    +static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
    +{
    + unsigned long enabled;
    + int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
    + if (!error)
    + apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
    + return 1;
    +}
    +
    +__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
    +
    +/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
    +static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    + if (aa_g_lock_policy)
    + return -EACCES;
    + return param_set_bool(val, kp);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    + return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    + return param_set_bool(val, kp);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    + return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    + return param_set_uint(val, kp);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    + return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    +
    + if (!apparmor_enabled)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + int i;
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    +
    + if (!apparmor_enabled)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + if (!val)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
    + if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
    + aa_g_audit = i;
    + return 0;
    + }
    + }
    +
    + return -EINVAL;
    +}
    +
    +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    +
    + if (!apparmor_enabled)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
    +}
    +
    +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
    +{
    + int i;
    + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
    + return -EPERM;
    +
    + if (!apparmor_enabled)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + if (!val)
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    + for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
    + if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
    + aa_g_profile_mode = i;
    + return 0;
    + }
    + }
    +
    + return -EINVAL;
    +}
    +
    +/*
    + * AppArmor init functions
    + */
    +
    +/**
    + * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
    + *
    + * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
    + */
    +static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
    +{
    + struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
    + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
    +
    + cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
    + if (!cxt)
    + return -ENOMEM;
    +
    + cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
    + cred->security = cxt;
    +
    + return 0;
    +}
    +
    +static int __init apparmor_init(void)
    +{
    + int error;
    +
    + if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
    + aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
    + apparmor_enabled = 0;
    + return 0;
    + }
    +
    + error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
    + if (error) {
    + AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
    + goto alloc_out;
    + }
    +
    + error = set_init_cxt();
    + if (error) {
    + AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
    + goto register_security_out;
    + }
    +
    + error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
    + if (error) {
    + AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
    + goto register_security_out;
    + }
    +
    + /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
    + apparmor_initialized = 1;
    + if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
    + aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
    + else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
    + aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
    + else
    + aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
    +
    + return error;
    +
    +register_security_out:
    + aa_free_root_ns();
    +
    +alloc_out:
    + aa_destroy_aafs();
    +
    + apparmor_enabled = 0;
    + return error;
    +
    +}
    +
    +security_initcall(apparmor_init);
    --
    1.7.1


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      Last update: 2010-07-27 05:01    [W:0.065 / U:34.072 seconds]
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