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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3] fs: allow protected cross-uid sticky symlinks
On Tue, Jun 01, 2010 at 02:07:34PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > I don't buy it. If we are concerned about the symlinks in the middle of
> > pathname, your checks are useless (mkdir /tmp/a, ln -s whatever /tmp/a/b,
> > have victim open /tmp/a/b/something). If we are not, then your checks are
> > in the wrong place.
> Well, that's not traditionally where the problems happen, but I have no
> problem strengthening the protection to include a full examination of the
> entire path looking for sticky/world-writable directories.
> If not, what is the right place for the checks?

Handling of trailing symlink on open(). At most. And I wouldn't be
surprised if the real answer turns out to include "... if we have
O_CREAT in flags", but that needs to be determined.

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