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SubjectRe: Upstream first policy
On Mon, Mar 08, 2010 at 03:37:38PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:

> Of course, you can make /etc unwritable, and that is indeed the
> traditional UNIX model of handling namespace security: by just
> implementing it as "content security" of the directory.
>
> The sgid and sticky bits can be used to further try to make it more
> fine-grained (exactly becuase it is _not_ sufficient to say "you can't
> read or write this directory" on a whole-directory basis), and obviously
> SELinux has extensions of its own too.

But that's not what the apparmor et.al. are doing. If you want (and that's
not obviously a good thing) fine-grained access control for directory
entries, it would at least make some sense. Prohibitively pricy, probably,
but that's a separate story. But they are *NOT* protecting /foo/bar directory
entry when you want to protect /foo/bar/baz/barf; it doesn't go up towards
root.

And if you *do* protect each ancestor and try to keep granularity, you'll
end up with complexity from hell.


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