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    SubjectRe: Upstream first policy

    On Mon, 8 Mar 2010, Al Viro wrote:
    > >
    > > I really don't understand why some people are unable to admit this fact.
    > Because you don't have to use that pathname to modify the bits returned
    > by read() after open() on that pathname?

    The thing is, I don't think it's an "either or".

    Sure, there is content security. Nobody disputes that. The security
    decision about how to open a file is about the contents of the file.

    So I'm not suggesting we _replace_ content-based security with
    pathname-based security. I'm just saying that pathnames actually do matter
    for security, and that they are an independent issue.

    > I'm not fond of selinux, to put it mildly, but "pathname-based" stuff simply
    > doesn't match how the pathname resolution is defined on Unix...

    Again, I'm not claiming that we should change how "open" works and has
    always worked. I don't even understand why you have that crazy "either or"
    mentality to begin with. Why?

    It's not "either pathname or inode". I'm saying _both_ make sense.

    In some situations, the name itself really is what is fundamentally
    special about the file.


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      Last update: 2010-03-08 20:03    [W:0.021 / U:0.896 seconds]
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