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SubjectRe: [PATCH 5/5] KVM: Allow host IRQ sharing for passed-through PCI 2.3 devices
On 12/06/2010 06:46 PM, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> Am 06.12.2010 17:40, Avi Kivity wrote:
> > On 12/06/2010 06:34 PM, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> >>>
> >>> What's the protocol for doing this? I suppose userspace has to disable
> >>> interrupts, ioctl(SET_INTX_MASK, masked), ..., ioctl(SET_INTX_MASK,
> >>> unmasked), enable interrupts?
> >>
> >> Userspace just has to synchronize against itself - what it already does:
> >> qemu_mutex, and masking/unmasking is synchronous /wrt the the executing
> >> VCPU. Otherwise, masking/unmasking is naturally racy, also in Real Life.
> >> The guest resolves the remaining races.
> >
> > I meant when qemu sets INTX_MASK and the kernel clears it immediately
> > afterwards because the two are not synchronized. I guess that won't
> > happen in practice because playing with INTX_MASK is very rare.
> Ah, there is indeed a race, and the qemu-kvm patches I did not post yet
> (to wait for the kernel interface to settle) actually suffer from it:
> userspace needs to set the kernel mask before writing the config space
> (it's the other way around ATM). This avoids that the kernel overwrites
> what userspace just wrote out. We always suffer from the race the other
> way around, see below.

Please document the protocol. Is this always the right order?
Shouldn't it be reversed when unmasking? I admit I'm confused about this.

> >>
> >> I think this is what VFIO does and is surely cleaner than this approach.
> >> But it's not possible with the existing interface (sysfs + KVM ioctls) -
> >> or can you restrict the sysfs access to the config space in such details?
> >
> > I'm sure you can, not sure it's worth it. Can the situation be
> > exploited? what if userspace lies?
> That's also the above scenario inverted: Userspace can mask or unmask at
> any time. If it unmasks a yet unhandled, thus raise interrupt, it will
> trigger another one. The kernel will catch it and mask it again. That
> can repeat forever with the frequency userspace is able to run its
> unmasking code. Not nice, but nothing to leverage for a DoS.

Ok (I think).

error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function

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