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SubjectRe: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers

* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:

> +kptr_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
> +exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces. When
> +kptr_restrict is set to (0), the default, there are no
> +restrictions. When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers
> +printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's
> +unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When kptr_restrict is set to
> +(2), kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0's
> +regardless of privileges.

Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused by
this?

We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
default) - they are not worth much if they are not.

Thanks,

Ingo


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