Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RFC] [PATCH 1/7] User Space Breakpoint Assistance Layer (UBP) | From | Peter Zijlstra <> | Date | Sun, 17 Jan 2010 16:03:13 +0100 |
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On Sun, 2010-01-17 at 16:59 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote: > On 01/17/2010 04:52 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > On Sun, 2010-01-17 at 16:39 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote: > > > >> On 01/15/2010 11:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > >> > >>> As previously stated, I think poking at a process's address space is an > >>> utter no-go. > >>> > >>> > >> Why not reserve an address space range for this, somewhere near the top > >> of memory? It doesn't have to be populated if it isn't used. > >> > > Because I think poking at a process's address space like that is gross. > > Also, if its fixed size you're imposing artificial limits on the number > > of possible probes. > > > > btw, an alternative is to require the caller to provide the address > space for this. If the caller is in another process, we need to allow > it to play with the target's address space (i.e. mmap_process()). I > don't think uprobes justifies this by itself, but mmap_process() can be > very useful for sandboxing with seccomp.
mmap_process() sounds utterly gross, one process playing with another process's address space.. yuck!
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