Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 14 Jan 2010 10:23:28 +0100 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4) |
| |
> Quoting Michael Stone (michael@laptop.org): > > Serge Hallyn wrote: > > >Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the > > >answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need > > >disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users? > > > > Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time > > (e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be > > dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork > > happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app. > > Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege > > processes is important to me. > > > > >is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from > > >bounding set)? > > > > Let me try to restate your idea: > > > > We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly > > permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility > > described in > > > > http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/ > > > > may be a good framework in which to implement this control. > > > > Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would > > work for me. > > That is a little more than I was saying this time though I think I > suggested it earlier. > > But really I don't think anyone would care to separate a system into > some processes allowed to do unprivileged disablenetwork and other > processes not allowed to, so a (root-owned mode 644) sysctl seems just > as useful.
Global solution like that is always wrong. (And we have better solution available.) Pavel
-- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
| |