Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Thu, 30 Jul 2009 11:06:45 +0200 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: mmap_min_addr and your local LSM (ok, just SELinux) |
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Hi!
> Brad Spengler recently pointed out that the SELinux decision on how to > handle mmap_min_addr in some ways weakens system security vs on a system > without SELinux (and in other ways can be stronger). There is a trade > off and a reason I did what I did but I would like ideas and discussion > on how to get the best of both worlds. > > With SELinux mapping the 0 page requires an SELinux policy permission, > mmap_zero. Without SELinux mapping the 0 page requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO. > Note that CAP_SYS_RAWIO roughly translates to uid=0 since noone really > does interesting things with capabilities.
I wonder if cap_sys_rawio is right capability for this..? rawio normally grants you kernel-llevel access, so you don't want to give it to wine. But maybe if it checked cap_sys_nice or some new capability, we could reasonably give that to wine, and problem would be gone?
cap_sys_obscure_features ?
(I guess vm86 mode should fall under that, too :-)
-- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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