Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 13 Aug 2009 16:14:50 -0700 (PDT) | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/3] Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module | From | David Miller <> |
| |
From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 14:45:37 -0400
> On Thursday 13 August 2009 09:44:51 am Eric Paris wrote: >> The networking code checks CAP_SYS_MODULE before using request_module() to >> try to load a kernel module. While this seems reasonable it's actually >> weakening system security since we have to allow CAP_SYS_MODULE for things >> like /sbin/ip and bluetoothd which need to be able to trigger module loads. >> CAP_SYS_MODULE actually grants those binaries the ability to directly load >> any code into the kernel. We should instead be protecting modprobe and the >> modules on disk, rather than granting random programs the ability to load >> code directly into the kernel. Instead we are going to gate those >> networking checks on CAP_NET_ADMIN which still limits them to root but >> which does not grant those processes the ability to load arbitrary code >> into the kernel. >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> > > Sounds and looks reasonable to me. > > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Looks fine to me:
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| |