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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/3] Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module
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From: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 14:45:37 -0400

> On Thursday 13 August 2009 09:44:51 am Eric Paris wrote:
>> The networking code checks CAP_SYS_MODULE before using request_module() to
>> try to load a kernel module. While this seems reasonable it's actually
>> weakening system security since we have to allow CAP_SYS_MODULE for things
>> like /sbin/ip and bluetoothd which need to be able to trigger module loads.
>> CAP_SYS_MODULE actually grants those binaries the ability to directly load
>> any code into the kernel. We should instead be protecting modprobe and the
>> modules on disk, rather than granting random programs the ability to load
>> code directly into the kernel. Instead we are going to gate those
>> networking checks on CAP_NET_ADMIN which still limits them to root but
>> which does not grant those processes the ability to load arbitrary code
>> into the kernel.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
>
> Sounds and looks reasonable to me.
>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>

Looks fine to me:

Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>


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