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SubjectRe: Linux 2.6.27.27
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 90764ee..387a5fd 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
VERSION = 2
PATCHLEVEL = 6
SUBLEVEL = 27
-EXTRAVERSION = .26
+EXTRAVERSION = .27
NAME = Trembling Tortoise

# *DOCUMENTATION*
@@ -340,7 +340,8 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ $(LINUXINCLUDE)

KBUILD_CFLAGS := -Wall -Wundef -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-trigraphs \
-fno-strict-aliasing -fno-common \
- -Werror-implicit-function-declaration
+ -Werror-implicit-function-declaration \
+ -fno-delete-null-pointer-checks
KBUILD_AFLAGS := -D__ASSEMBLY__

# Read KERNELRELEASE from include/config/kernel.release (if it exists)
@@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wdeclaration-after-statement,)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wno-pointer-sign,)

# disable invalid "can't wrap" optimzations for signed / pointers
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fwrapv)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fno-strict-overflow)

# Add user supplied CPPFLAGS, AFLAGS and CFLAGS as the last assignments
# But warn user when we do so
diff --git a/drivers/block/floppy.c b/drivers/block/floppy.c
index 615fcd3..5900f76 100644
--- a/drivers/block/floppy.c
+++ b/drivers/block/floppy.c
@@ -3320,7 +3320,10 @@ static inline int set_geometry(unsigned int cmd, struct floppy_struct *g,
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
mutex_lock(&open_lock);
- LOCK_FDC(drive, 1);
+ if (lock_fdc(drive, 1)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&open_lock);
+ return -EINTR;
+ }
floppy_type[type] = *g;
floppy_type[type].name = "user format";
for (cnt = type << 2; cnt < (type << 2) + 4; cnt++)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c
index 925efaf..ace998c 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm.c
@@ -265,10 +265,6 @@ static int dm_blk_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
goto out;
}

- if (test_bit(DMF_FREEING, &md->flags) ||
- test_bit(DMF_DELETING, &md->flags))
- return NULL;
-
dm_get(md);
atomic_inc(&md->open_count);

diff --git a/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c b/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c
index c6bad98..7faf84f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tulip/interrupt.c
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int tulip_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
/* If we own the next entry, it is a new packet. Send it up. */
while ( ! (tp->rx_ring[entry].status & cpu_to_le32(DescOwned))) {
s32 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->rx_ring[entry].status);
+ short pkt_len;

if (tp->dirty_rx + RX_RING_SIZE == tp->cur_rx)
break;
@@ -151,8 +152,28 @@ int tulip_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
if (++work_done >= budget)
goto not_done;

- if ((status & 0x38008300) != 0x0300) {
- if ((status & 0x38000300) != 0x0300) {
+ /*
+ * Omit the four octet CRC from the length.
+ * (May not be considered valid until we have
+ * checked status for RxLengthOver2047 bits)
+ */
+ pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Maximum pkt_len is 1518 (1514 + vlan header)
+ * Anything higher than this is always invalid
+ * regardless of RxLengthOver2047 bits
+ */
+
+ if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+ RxDescCRCError |
+ RxDescCollisionSeen |
+ RxDescRunt |
+ RxDescDescErr |
+ RxWholePkt)) != RxWholePkt
+ || pkt_len > 1518) {
+ if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+ RxWholePkt)) != RxWholePkt) {
/* Ingore earlier buffers. */
if ((status & 0xffff) != 0x7fff) {
if (tulip_debug > 1)
@@ -161,30 +182,23 @@ int tulip_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
dev->name, status);
tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
}
- } else if (status & RxDescFatalErr) {
+ } else {
/* There was a fatal error. */
if (tulip_debug > 2)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Receive error, Rx status %8.8x.\n",
dev->name, status);
tp->stats.rx_errors++; /* end of a packet.*/
- if (status & 0x0890) tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
+ if (pkt_len > 1518 ||
+ (status & RxDescRunt))
+ tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
+
if (status & 0x0004) tp->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
if (status & 0x0002) tp->stats.rx_crc_errors++;
if (status & 0x0001) tp->stats.rx_fifo_errors++;
}
} else {
- /* Omit the four octet CRC from the length. */
- short pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
struct sk_buff *skb;

-#ifndef final_version
- if (pkt_len > 1518) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Bogus packet size of %d (%#x).\n",
- dev->name, pkt_len, pkt_len);
- pkt_len = 1518;
- tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
- }
-#endif
/* Check if the packet is long enough to accept without copying
to a minimally-sized skbuff. */
if (pkt_len < tulip_rx_copybreak
@@ -357,14 +371,35 @@ static int tulip_rx(struct net_device *dev)
/* If we own the next entry, it is a new packet. Send it up. */
while ( ! (tp->rx_ring[entry].status & cpu_to_le32(DescOwned))) {
s32 status = le32_to_cpu(tp->rx_ring[entry].status);
+ short pkt_len;

if (tulip_debug > 5)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: In tulip_rx(), entry %d %8.8x.\n",
dev->name, entry, status);
if (--rx_work_limit < 0)
break;
- if ((status & 0x38008300) != 0x0300) {
- if ((status & 0x38000300) != 0x0300) {
+
+ /*
+ Omit the four octet CRC from the length.
+ (May not be considered valid until we have
+ checked status for RxLengthOver2047 bits)
+ */
+ pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
+ /*
+ Maximum pkt_len is 1518 (1514 + vlan header)
+ Anything higher than this is always invalid
+ regardless of RxLengthOver2047 bits
+ */
+
+ if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+ RxDescCRCError |
+ RxDescCollisionSeen |
+ RxDescRunt |
+ RxDescDescErr |
+ RxWholePkt)) != RxWholePkt
+ || pkt_len > 1518) {
+ if ((status & (RxLengthOver2047 |
+ RxWholePkt)) != RxWholePkt) {
/* Ingore earlier buffers. */
if ((status & 0xffff) != 0x7fff) {
if (tulip_debug > 1)
@@ -373,31 +408,22 @@ static int tulip_rx(struct net_device *dev)
dev->name, status);
tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
}
- } else if (status & RxDescFatalErr) {
+ } else {
/* There was a fatal error. */
if (tulip_debug > 2)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Receive error, Rx status %8.8x.\n",
dev->name, status);
tp->stats.rx_errors++; /* end of a packet.*/
- if (status & 0x0890) tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
+ if (pkt_len > 1518 ||
+ (status & RxDescRunt))
+ tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
if (status & 0x0004) tp->stats.rx_frame_errors++;
if (status & 0x0002) tp->stats.rx_crc_errors++;
if (status & 0x0001) tp->stats.rx_fifo_errors++;
}
} else {
- /* Omit the four octet CRC from the length. */
- short pkt_len = ((status >> 16) & 0x7ff) - 4;
struct sk_buff *skb;

-#ifndef final_version
- if (pkt_len > 1518) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Bogus packet size of %d (%#x).\n",
- dev->name, pkt_len, pkt_len);
- pkt_len = 1518;
- tp->stats.rx_length_errors++;
- }
-#endif
-
/* Check if the packet is long enough to accept without copying
to a minimally-sized skbuff. */
if (pkt_len < tulip_rx_copybreak
diff --git a/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h b/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h
index 19abbc3..0afa2d4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h
+++ b/drivers/net/tulip/tulip.h
@@ -201,8 +201,38 @@ enum desc_status_bits {
DescStartPkt = 0x20000000,
DescEndRing = 0x02000000,
DescUseLink = 0x01000000,
- RxDescFatalErr = 0x008000,
+
+ /*
+ * Error summary flag is logical or of 'CRC Error', 'Collision Seen',
+ * 'Frame Too Long', 'Runt' and 'Descriptor Error' flags generated
+ * within tulip chip.
+ */
+ RxDescErrorSummary = 0x8000,
+ RxDescCRCError = 0x0002,
+ RxDescCollisionSeen = 0x0040,
+
+ /*
+ * 'Frame Too Long' flag is set if packet length including CRC exceeds
+ * 1518. However, a full sized VLAN tagged frame is 1522 bytes
+ * including CRC.
+ *
+ * The tulip chip does not block oversized frames, and if this flag is
+ * set on a receive descriptor it does not indicate the frame has been
+ * truncated. The receive descriptor also includes the actual length.
+ * Therefore we can safety ignore this flag and check the length
+ * ourselves.
+ */
+ RxDescFrameTooLong = 0x0080,
+ RxDescRunt = 0x0800,
+ RxDescDescErr = 0x4000,
RxWholePkt = 0x00000300,
+ /*
+ * Top three bits of 14 bit frame length (status bits 27-29) should
+ * never be set as that would make frame over 2047 bytes. The Receive
+ * Watchdog flag (bit 4) may indicate the length is over 2048 and the
+ * length field is invalid.
+ */
+ RxLengthOver2047 = 0x38000010
};


diff --git a/drivers/pci/iova.c b/drivers/pci/iova.c
index 3ef4ac0..078bf8b 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/iova.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/iova.c
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2006, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright © 2006-2009, Intel Corporation.
*
- * This file is released under the GPLv2.
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
+ * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
+ * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
+ * more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
+ * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
+ * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
*
- * Copyright (C) 2006-2008 Intel Corporation
* Author: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
*/

@@ -123,7 +133,15 @@ move_left:
/* Insert the new_iova into domain rbtree by holding writer lock */
/* Add new node and rebalance tree. */
{
- struct rb_node **entry = &((prev)), *parent = NULL;
+ struct rb_node **entry, *parent = NULL;
+
+ /* If we have 'prev', it's a valid place to start the
+ insertion. Otherwise, start from the root. */
+ if (prev)
+ entry = &prev;
+ else
+ entry = &iovad->rbroot.rb_node;
+
/* Figure out where to put new node */
while (*entry) {
struct iova *this = container_of(*entry,
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index ae9775d..eeb7e56 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -572,12 +572,10 @@ static inline void set_page_links(struct page *page, enum zone_type zone,
*/
static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
hint &= PAGE_MASK;
if (((void *)hint != NULL) &&
(hint < mmap_min_addr))
return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr);
-#endif
return hint;
}

diff --git a/include/linux/personality.h b/include/linux/personality.h
index a84e9ff..1261208 100644
--- a/include/linux/personality.h
+++ b/include/linux/personality.h
@@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ enum {
* Security-relevant compatibility flags that must be
* cleared upon setuid or setgid exec:
*/
-#define PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)
+#define PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | \
+ ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE | \
+ ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT | \
+ MMAP_PAGE_ZERO)

/*
* Personality types.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 80c4d00..1638afd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2134,6 +2134,8 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long addr_only)
{
+ if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ return -EACCES;
return 0;
}

diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
index 03d796c..87f675a 100644
--- a/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/kernel/resource.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static int __init reserve_setup(char *str)
static struct resource reserve[MAXRESERVE];

for (;;) {
- int io_start, io_num;
+ unsigned int io_start, io_num;
int x = reserved;

if (get_option (&str, &io_start) != 2)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 6816e6d..1228d65 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1132,7 +1132,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
.strategy = &sysctl_jiffies,
},
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
{
.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
.procname = "mmap_min_addr",
@@ -1141,7 +1140,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = &proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
{
.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 0bd9c2d..07b4ec4 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -208,3 +208,21 @@ config VIRT_TO_BUS

config MMU_NOTIFIER
bool
+
+config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+ int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+ default 4096
+ help
+ This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+ from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+ can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+ For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+ a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+ On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+ Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+ permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+ this protection disabled.
+
+ This value can be changed after boot using the
+ /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 2ae093e..d330758 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ int sysctl_overcommit_ratio = 50; /* default is 50% */
int sysctl_max_map_count __read_mostly = DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT;
atomic_long_t vm_committed_space = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);

+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
+
/*
* Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
* mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 5592939..38411dd 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -92,28 +92,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG

See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
more information about this module.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
- int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
- depends on SECURITY
- default 0
- help
- This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
- from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
- can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
-
- For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
- a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
- On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
- Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
- permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
- this protection disabled.
-
- This value can be changed after boot using the
- /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.

+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a4b4f5..27a315d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);

struct security_operations *security_ops; /* Initialized to NULL */

-/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
-unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
-
static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
{
/* verify the security_operations structure exists */
--
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