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SubjectRe: [RFC] tcp: race in receive part
Jiri Olsa a écrit :
> Hi,
>
> in RHEL4 we can see a race in the tcp layer. We were not able to reproduce
> this on the upstream kernel, but since the issue occurs very rarelly
> (once per 8 days), we just might not be lucky.
>
> I'm affraid this might be a long email, I'll try to structure it nicely.. :)
>

Thanks for your mail and detailed analysis

>
>
> RACE DESCRIPTION
> ================
>
> There's a nice pdf describing the issue (and sollution using locks) on
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=345014

I could not reach this url unfortunatly

--> "You are not authorized to access bug #494404. "

>
>
> The race fires, when following code paths meet, and the tp->rcv_nxt and
> __add_wait_queue updates stay in CPU caches.
>
> CPU1 CPU2
>
>
> sys_select receive packet
> ... ...
> __add_wait_queue update tp->rcv_nxt
> ... ...
> tp->rcv_nxt check sock_def_readable
> ... {
> schedule ...
> if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
> wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep)
> ...
> }
>
> If there were no cache the code would work ok, since the wait_queue and
> rcv_nxt are opposit to each other.
>
> Meaning that once tp->rcv_nxt is updated by CPU2, the CPU1 either already
> passed the tp->rcv_nxt check and sleeps, or will get the new value for
> tp->rcv_nxt and will return with new data mask.
> In both cases the process (CPU1) is being added to the wait queue, so the
> waitqueue_active (CPU2) call cannot miss and will wake up CPU1.
>
> The bad case is when the __add_wait_queue changes done by CPU1 stay in its
> cache , and so does the tp->rcv_nxt update on CPU2 side. The CPU1 will then
> endup calling schedule and sleep forever if there are no more data on the
> socket.
>
> Adding smp_mb() calls before sock_def_readable call and after __add_wait_queue
> should prevent the above bad scenario.
>
> The upstream patch is attached. It seems to prevent the issue.
>
>
>
> CPU BUGS
> ========
>
> The customer has been able to reproduce this problem only on one CPU model:
> Xeon E5345*2. They didn't reproduce on XEON MV, for example.

Is there an easy way to reproduce the problem ?

>
> That CPU model happens to have 2 possible issues, that might cause the issue:
> (see errata http://www.intel.com/Assets/PDF/specupdate/315338.pdf)
>
> AJ39 and AJ18. The first one can be workarounded by BIOS upgrade,
> the other one has following notes:

AJ18 only matters on unaligned accesses, tcp code doesnt do this.

>
> Software should ensure at least one of the following is true when
> modifying shared data by multiple agents:
> • The shared data is aligned
> • Proper semaphores or barriers are used in order to
> prevent concurrent data accesses.
>
>
>
> RFC
> ===
>
> I'm aware that not having this issue reproduced on upstream lowers the odds
> having this checked in. However AFAICS the issue is present. I'd appreciate
> any comment/ideas.
>
>
> thanks,
> jirka
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
> index 17b89c5..f5d9dbf 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
> @@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ unsigned int tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait)
> struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
>
> poll_wait(file, sk->sk_sleep, wait);

poll_wait() calls add_wait_queue() which contains a
spin_lock_irqsave()/spin_unlock_irqrestore() pair

Documentation/memory-barriers.txt states in line 1123 :

Memory operations issued after the LOCK will be completed after the LOCK
operation has completed.

and line 1131 states :

Memory operations issued before the UNLOCK will be completed before the
UNLOCK operation has completed.

So yes, there is no full smp_mb() in poll_wait()

> +
> + /* Get in sync with tcp_data_queue, tcp_urg
> + and tcp_rcv_established function. */
> + smp_mb();

If this barrier is really necessary, I guess it should be done in poll_wait() itself.

Documentation/memory-barriers.txt misses some information about poll_wait()




> +
> if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
> return inet_csk_listen_poll(sk);
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> index 2bdb0da..0606e5e 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
> @@ -4362,8 +4362,11 @@ queue_and_out:
>
> if (eaten > 0)
> __kfree_skb(skb);
> - else if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
> + else if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
> + /* Get in sync with tcp_poll function. */
> + smp_mb();
> sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
> + }
> return;
>

Oh well... if smp_mb() is needed, I believe it should be done
right before "if (waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep) ... "
read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ smp_mb();
if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
wake_up_interruptible(sk->sk_sleep)
It would match other parts in kernel (see fs/splice.c, fs/aio.c, ...)

Strange thing is that read_lock() on x86 is a full memory barrier, as it uses
"lock subl $0x1,(%eax)"

Maybe we could define a smp_mb_after_read_lock() (a compiler barrier() on x86)

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