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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole

* Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) <> wrote:

> On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 14:54, Ingo Molnar <> wrote:
> > Which other system calls would you like to use? Futexes might be
> > one, for fast synchronization primitives?
> There are a large number of system calls that "normal" C/C++ code
> uses quite frequently, and that are not security sensitive. A
> typical example would be gettimeofday(). But there are other
> system calls, where the sandbox would not really need to inspect
> arguments as the call does not expose any exploitable interface.
> It is currently awkward that in order to use seccomp we have to
> intercept all system calls and provide alternative implementations
> for them; whereas we really only care about a comparatively small
> number of security critical operations that we need to restrict.
> Also, any redirected system call ends up incurring at least two
> context switches, which is needlessly expensive for the large
> number of trivial system calls. We are quite happy that read() and
> write(), which are quite important to us, do not incur this
> penalty.

doing a (per arch) bitmap of harmless syscalls and replacing the
mode1_syscalls[] check with that in kernel/seccomp.c would be a
pretty reasonable extension. (.config controllable perhaps, for

It would probably be faster than the current loop over
mode1_syscalls[] as well.

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