Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 1 Mar 2009 16:21:30 -0600 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: How much of a mess does OpenVZ make? ;) Was: What can OpenVZ do? |
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Quoting Alexey Dobriyan (adobriyan@gmail.com): > On Sun, Mar 01, 2009 at 02:02:31PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Alexey Dobriyan (adobriyan@gmail.com): > > > On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 01:31:12AM +0300, Alexey Dobriyan wrote: > > > > This is collecting and start of dumping part of cleaned up OpenVZ C/R > > > > implementation, FYI. > > > > > > OK, here is second version which shows what to do with shared objects > > > (cr_dump_nsproxy(), cr_dump_task_struct()), introduced more checks > > > (still no unlinked files) and dumps some more information including > > > structures connections (cr_pos_*) > > > > > > Dumping pids in under thinking because in OpenVZ pids are saved as > > > numbers due to CLONE_NEWPID is not allowed in container. In presense > > > of multiple CLONE_NEWPID levels this must present a big problem. Looks > > > like there is now way to not dump pids as separate object. > > > > > > As result, struct cr_image_pid is variable-sized, don't know how this will > > > play later. > > > > > > Also, pid refcount check for external pointers is busted right now, > > > because /proc inode pins struct pid, so there is almost always refcount > > > vs ->o_count mismatch. > > > > > > No restore yet. ;-) > > > > Hi Alexey, > > > > thanks for posting this. Of course there are some predictable responses > > (I like the simplicity of pure in-kernel, Dave will not :) but this > > needs to be posted to make us talk about it. > > > > A few more comments that came to me while looking it over: > > > > 1. cap_sys_admin check is unfortunate. In discussions about Oren's > > patchset we've agreed that not having that check from the outset forces > > us to consider security with each new patch and feature, which is a good > > thing. > > Removing CAP_SYS_ADMIN on restore?
And checkpoint.
-serge
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