lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2009]   [Feb]   [13]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v8 1/7] PCI: initialize and release SR-IOV capability
On Fri, Feb 13, 2009 at 05:56:44PM +0100, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > + pci_read_config_word(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_CTRL, &ctrl);
> > + if (ctrl & PCI_SRIOV_CTRL_VFE) {
> > + pci_write_config_word(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_CTRL, 0);
> > + msleep(100);
>
> That's really long. Hopefully that's really needed.

Yes and no. The spec says:

To allow components to perform internal initialization, system software
must wait for at least 100 ms after changing the VF Enable bit from
a 0 to a 1, before it is permitted to issue Configuration Requests to
the VFs which are enabled by that VF Enable bit.

So we don't have to wait here, but we do have to wait before exposing
all these virtual functions to the rest of the system. Should we add
more complexity, perhaps spawn a thread to do it asynchronously, or add
0.1 seconds to device initialisation? A question without an easy
answer, iMO.

> > +
> > + pci_write_config_word(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_CTRL, ctrl);
> > + pci_write_config_word(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_NUM_VF, total);
> > + pci_read_config_word(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_VF_OFFSET, &offset);
> > + pci_read_config_word(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_VF_STRIDE, &stride);
> > + if (!offset || (total > 1 && !stride))
> > + return -EIO;
> > +
> > + pci_read_config_dword(dev, pos + PCI_SRIOV_SUP_PGSIZE, &pgsz);
> > + i = PAGE_SHIFT > 12 ? PAGE_SHIFT - 12 : 0;
> > + pgsz &= ~((1 << i) - 1);
> > + if (!pgsz)
> > + return -EIO;
>
> All the error paths don't seem to undo the config space writes.
> How will the devices behave with half initialized context?

I think we should clear the VF_ENABLE bit. That action is also fraught
with danger:

If software Clears VF Enable, software must allow 1 second after VF
Enable is Cleared before reading any field in the SR-IOV Extended
Capability or the VF Migration State Array (see Section 3.3.15.1).

Another msleep(1000) here? Not pretty, but what else can we do?

Not to mention the danger of something else innocently using lspci -xxxx
to read a field in the extended capability -- I suspect we also need to
block user config accesses before clearing this bit.

--
Matthew Wilcox Intel Open Source Technology Centre
"Bill, look, we understand that you're interested in selling us this
operating system, but compare it to ours. We can't possibly take such
a retrograde step."


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2009-02-13 18:53    [W:1.206 / U:0.008 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site