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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK)
> Eric Biederman writes:
>> Alan Cox <> writes:
>>> Michael Stone writes:
>>>> the LSM-based version *does not* resolve the situation to my satisfaction as a
>>>> userland hacker due to the well-known and long-standing adoption and
>>>> compositionality problems facing small LSMs. ;)
>>> For things like Fedora it's probably an "interesting idea, perhaps we
>>> should do it using SELinux" sort of problem, but a config option for a
>>> magic network prctl is also going to be hard to adopt without producing a
>>> good use case - and avoiding that by dumping crap into everyones kernel
>>> fast paths isn't a good idea either.
>If I understand the problem the goal is to disable access to ipc
>mechanism that don't have the usual unix permissions. To get
>something that is usable for non-root processes, and to get something
>that is widely deployed so you don't have to jump through hoops in
>end user applications to use it.


You understand correctly. Thank you for this cogent restatement.

>We have widely deployed mechanisms that are what you want or nearly
>what you want already in the form of the various namespaces built for

It's true that your work is closer to what I want than anything else that I've
seen so far...

>I propose you introduce a permanent disable of executing suid

I'm open to the idea but I don't understand the need that motivates it yet.

Could you please explain further? (or point me to an existing explanation?)

>After which point it is another trivial patch to allow unsharing of
>the network namespace if executing suid applications are disabled.

How do you propose to address the problem with the Unix sockets?



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