lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2008]   [Aug]   [5]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interfaceforon access scanning

A: No.
Q: Should I include quotations after my reply?

On Tue, Aug 05, 2008 at 02:04:26PM -0400, Press, Jonathan wrote:
> I'm not sure if this is off the direct idea of this thread, or if I am
> possibly missing the whole point.

I think you might be missing the point a bit here, as the traditional
Unix model that Linux has prevents much of what the "traditional AV"
products need to do, right?

> However, I want to point out that scanning on close is still an integral
> part of AV protection, even if intercepting opens and execs
> theoretically catches everything.

Great, then put a hook in glibc and catch all closes and then kick off
your scanning.

> You can say that there are four parts to the malware life cycle --
> getting on a machine, residing there, causing local damage, and
> propagating elsewhere. It is part of the philosophy of AV protection
> that you do everything you can to prevent all of them.

But this proposed patchset does not do much to prevent all of these,
right?

> That's why there are scans on close, scheduled scans, and scans on
> open. Most of our users employ all three and do not rely on one or
> two. If an infection arrives on a machine and finds a home because it
> is assumed that it will be caught when it is opened for use, then it
> is just one more compromise away from doing damage and/or spreading.

So how are you going about preventing the "infection from arriving"
with this proposed patchset?

Isn't that something that SELinux or another LSM can prevent better?

thanks,

greg k-h


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2008-08-05 20:17    [W:0.213 / U:0.428 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site