Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 04 Aug 2008 20:44:28 -0700 | From | Casey Schaufler <> | Subject | Re: [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interface for on access scanning |
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Cliffe wrote: > If we had stackable LSMs then the required functionality could simply > be built into the LSM interface. Then the anti-malware would simply > stack itself with other LSMs. In my opinion this is a perfect example > for the argument of stackable LSMs.
No argument from me.
> So far we mainly have LSMs which provide an extra access control > mechanism (in addition to DAC).
Yes. This is the design center for the LSM.
> IMHO, Ideally DAC could be another stackable LSM (enabled by default).
Yup. Search the archives for "authoritative hooks".
> Other security schemes such as intrusion detection, > firewalls/netfilter, anti-malware, and application restrictions > (sandboxes such as jails or finer grained restrictions such as > AppArmor) could all register LSMs onto the stack.
Stacking is easy for files. It's a real pain in the backside for UDP packets.
> Additional infrastructure would be necessary. Permissible security > remains a item of contention. Perhaps I am naive but I think most LSMs > could work based on accept/reject. Where every LSM must accept an > action in order for it to be carried out.
Please propose patches.
> MHO,
Oh, humility isn't all it's cracked up to be. Show us all up and write the code. I'm serious, I don't think there's anyone here who would object to a really good stacking scheme.
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