Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: Frustrated with capabilities.. | From | "David P. Quigley" <> | Date | Fri, 29 Aug 2008 10:20:01 -0400 |
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On Thu, 2008-08-28 at 21:47 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > David P. Quigley wrote: > > On Thu, 2008-08-28 at 13:48 -0400, Theodore Tso wrote: > > > >> On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 05:45:34PM +0300, Markku Savela wrote: > >> > >>>> From: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz> > >>>> > >>>> Yes, you need upcoming filesystem capabilities. Binary may not > >>>> inherit capabilities unless filesystem flags permit that. > >>>> > >>> I think this is wrong. Normal executables inherit uid/gid and > >>> supplementary groups by default. Why should capabilities be any > >>> different? > >>> > >> Well, because that's not the what the POSIX draft specification (and > >> the rest of the Unix industry who were striving to meet the US > >> Department of Defense's "B2 by '92" initiative) ended up implementing. > >> > > > > Minor nit. It was actually C2(Controlled Access Protection) by '92 which > > is mainly just DAC protections as opposed to B2(Structured Protection) > > which also included MAC policies and Sensitivity labels in addition to > > DAC protections > > But the fun part was that the evaluation requirements for B1, > which fell in between C2 and B2 (the order from least secure to > most was D, C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1, and "Beyond A1") where so > close to those for C2 that everyone implemented B1, which did > include MAC policy in the form of Bell and LaPadula sensitivity. > The privilege model (now called capabilities, and you have to buy > me a beer to get the whole story) does not actually come in the > requirements until B3, although some people will argue that it > was intended they be included at B2. Even though no one even tried > a B3 and no one succeeded at B2 everyone did capabilities based > on one of the drafts or another. > > Anyone who thinks that the capability scheme is wrong headed is > encouraged to read the P1003.1e/2c (withdrawn) DRAFT. It's on > the web in several places. You may end up still thinking it's > wrong, but at least you will have seen how the arguments got > hashed out. > > And we're still not talking about the Jackson Hole meeting. >
And one wonders why these certs aren't in use anymore ;)
Dave
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