Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Sun, 17 Aug 2008 20:18:25 -0500 | | From | "Steve French" <> | | Subject | Re: OOPS in request_key.c bisected (and then refound) |
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Copying lkml on this additional feedback on the patch to fix the oops introduced in April by the keyctl subsystem
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 2:45 PM, Rutger Nijlunsing <rutger.nijlunsing@gmail.com> wrote: > When trying to mount an CIFS share with SPGENO on Debian, I got > nothing. Digging deeping revealing on OOPS at function > call_sbin_request_key+0x166/0x255in 2.6.27 which was not there in > 2.6.25. Bisecting this with the simplest command generating the OOPS, > which was taken from 'man keyctl': > > keyctl request2 user debug:yyyy spoon > > took about 4 hours on the evolutionary dead-end Pentium 4 and returned > commit: > > commit 69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9 > Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Date: Tue Apr 29 01:01:31 2008 -0700 > > keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed > > ...as the culprit. > > Googling for this revealed that this OOPS had been reported before in > May, that a patch was written, tested and considered OK: > http://lists.samba.org/archive/linux-cifs-client/2008-May/003001.html > > Applying this patch is still the right thing to do since it made the > OOPS disappear. Hopefully this will solve my SPNEGO problems, but > that's a second concern. Here is the patch again, together with > additional Tested-bys: > > --- > KEYS: Make request key instantiate the per-user keyrings > > Make request_key() instantiate the per-user keyrings so that it doesn't oops > if it needs to get hold of the user session keyring because there isn't a > session keyring in place. > > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Tested-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> > Tested-by: Rutger Nijlunsing <rutger.nijlunsing@gmail.com> > --- > > security/keys/internal.h | 1 + > security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 +- > security/keys/request_key.c | 4 ++++ > 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > > diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h > index 8c05587..2bdfacc 100644 > --- a/security/keys/internal.h > +++ b/security/keys/internal.h > @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, > > extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); > > +extern int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk); > extern int install_thread_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk); > extern int install_process_keyring(struct task_struct *tsk); > > diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c > index 5be6d01..45b240a 100644 > --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c > +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c > @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { > /* > * install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID > */ > -static int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk) > +int install_user_keyrings(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > struct user_struct *user = tsk->user; > struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; > diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c > index ba32ca6..abea08f 100644 > --- a/security/keys/request_key.c > +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c > @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, > > kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op); > > + ret = install_user_keyrings(tsk); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto error_alloc; > + > /* allocate a new session keyring */ > sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial); > > > > -- > Rutger Nijlunsing ---------------------------------- eludias ed dse.nl > never attribute to a conspiracy which can be explained by incompetence > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >
-- Thanks,
Steve
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