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SubjectRe: TALPA - a threat model? well sorta.
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Arjan van de Ven wrote on 13/08/2008 19:21:49:

> > However, questions of which version of virus database was used to scan
> > a particular file should be stored outside of the filesystem, since
>
> well I was assuming we only store this in memory (say in the inode) and
> just rescan the file if we destroy the in memory inode.
> I don't see the need for this to be persistent data; in fact I assume
> (Eric, please confirm) that this data is not *supposed* to be
> persistent.

Correct.

> > each product will have its own version namespace, and the questions of
> > what happens if a user switches from one version checker to another is
>
> yes that's a hard question; what if you have 2 virus scanners active.
>
> (they could register a version of the database with the kernel, and the
> in kernel version-cookie could be a hash of all registered versions I
> suppose.. if anything changes ever we just rehash and scan as if we
> have to do that)

It is in fact really simple with the proposed inode versioning approach.
Any client which wants to invalidate the cache just needs to bump the
global version number which will force a rescan on next access.

Tvrtko


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