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SubjectRe: [RFC] Tracepoint proposal
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"Takashi Nishiie" <t-nishiie@np.css.fujitsu.com> writes:

> [...]
> Each kernel sub-system seems to have its own way of dealing with
> debugging statements. Some of these methods include 'dprintk',
> 'pr_debug', 'dev_debug', 'DEBUGP'. I think that these functions are
> the tracepoints that has been availably mounted without setting up
> the tool set of the outside. I think whether mounting that unites
> these functions can be done if kernel marker and tracepoint are used.

There are efforts underway to collect these various debug methods into
a single run-time-dynamic stream, which may even turn out to connect
to markers.

> By the way, isn't there problem on security? What kprobe, jprobe,
> and kernel marker, etc. offer looks like what the framework of Linux
> Security Module had offered before. Gotten kprobe, jprobe, and
> kernel marker, etc. should not be exported to the userland for
> security because it becomes the hotbed of rootkits.

These are all kernel-side facilities with no direct connection to
user-land.

> Users such as kprobe, jprobe, and kernel marker should not be
> Loadable Kernel Module. [...]

That would defeat their usefulness. Remember, kernel modules run with
no hardware-level restrictions at all, so if an adversary managed to
load up some kernel malware module, the game is over, whether or not
they use kprobes.

- FChE


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