Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 7 Mar 2008 15:32:20 -0600 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup |
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Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com): > > --- Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > > > > > On Fri, 2008-03-07 at 12:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com): > > > > > > > > --- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > ... > > > > > > > > > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good > > solution > > > > > to offer isolation. > > > > > > > > Smack does it better and cheaper. (Unless you define good==selinux) > > > > (insert smiley) > > > > > > Ah, thanks - I hadn't looked into it, but yes IIUC smack should > > > definately work. I'll have to give that a shot. > > > > Not if you want to confine uid 0. smack doesn't control capabilities, > > even the ones used to override it. > > > > So you'd have to at least configure your per-process bset and file caps > > rather carefully. And even then you have to watch out for things with > > CAP_MAC* or CAP_SETPCAP. > > Shrug. As if getting 800,000 lines of policy definition > for a thousand applications completely correct is going to be easier.
Folks, as I get time I will try with both :)
I suspect the CAP_MAC_ADMIN will mean containers won't be able to do any policy updates without an update to smack to do a CAP_NS_OVERRIDE type of thing. For SELinux I've got my hopes on the userspace policy daemon, but first (my next step atm) I need to get the namespace thing going (vserver1.root_t etc).
-serge
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