Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 12 Mar 2008 09:18:42 -0500 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup |
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Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov): > > On Wed, 2008-03-12 at 09:18 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Wed, 2008-03-12 at 08:09 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Quoting Pavel Emelyanov (xemul@openvz.org): > > > > Greg KH wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 12:57:55PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote: > > > > >> Besides, I've measured some things - the lat_syscall test for open from > > > > >> lmbench test suite and the nptl perf test. Here are the results: > > > > >> > > > > >> sec nosec > > > > >> open 3.0980s 3.0709s > > > > >> nptl 2.7746s 2.7710s > > > > >> > > > > >> So we have 0.88% loss in open and ~0.15% with nptl. I know, this is not that > > > > >> much, but it is noticeable. Besides, this is only two tests, digging deeper > > > > >> may reveal more. > > > > > > > > > > I think that is in the noise of sampling if you run that test many more > > > > > times. > > > > > > > > These numbers are average values of 20 runs of each test. I didn't > > > > provide the measurement accuracy, but the abs(open.sec - open.nosec) > > > > is greater than it. > > > > > > > > >> Let alone the fact that simply turning the CONFIG_SECURITY to 'y' puts +8Kb > > > > >> to the vmlinux... > > > > >> > > > > >> I think, I finally agree with you and Al Viro, that the kobj mapper is > > > > >> not the right place to put the filtering, but taking the above numbers > > > > >> into account, can we put the "hooks" into the #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ > > > > >> versions of security_inode_permission/security_file_permission/etc? > > > > > > > > > > Ask the security module interface maintainers about this, not me :) > > > > > > > > OK :) Thanks for your time, Greg. > > > > > > > > So, Serge, since you already have a LSM-based version, maybe you can > > > > change it with the proposed "fix" and send it to LSM maintainers for > > > > review? > > > > > > To take the point of view of someone who neither wants containers nor > > > LSM but just a fast box, > > > > > > you're asking me to introduce LSM hooks for the !SECURITY case? :) > > > > > > I can give it a shot, but I expect some complaints. Now at least the > > > _mknod hook shouldn't be a hotpath, and I suppose I can add yet > > > an #ifdef inside the !SECURITY version of security_inode_permission(). > > > I still expect some complaints though. I'll send something soon. > > > > Not sure I'm following the plot here, but please don't do anything that > > will prohibit the use of containers/namespaces with security modules > > like SELinux/Smack. Yes, that's a legitimate use case, and there will > > be people who will want to do that - they serve different but > > complementary purposes (containers are _not_ a substitute for MAC). We > > don't want them to be exclusive of one another. > > Also, note that "real" device labeling and access control (i.e. bind a > label to a device in the kernel irrespective of what device node is used > to access it so that a process that can create any device nodes at all > can't effectively bypass all device access controls just by creating an > arbitrary node to any device in a type accessible to it) is already > called out on our kernel todo list for SELinux, and contributions there > would be welcome.
I'll take a look at the todo list (James' I assume). The dev_cgroup lsm will have to come first, I'll see about doing the SELinux version as well.
thanks, -serge
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