Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 5 Dec 2008 10:45:52 -0600 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/2] user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER |
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Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): > "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> writes: > > > While ideally CLONE_NEWUSER will eventually require no > > privilege, the required permission checks are currently > > not there. As a result, CLONE_NEWUSER has the same effect > > as a setuid(0)+setgroups(1,"0"). While we already require > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN, requiring CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID seems > > appropriate. > > This looks reasonable. For the short term we will need a greater > set of caps to be able to do all of the interesting things.
Could you ack the patch? Stephen explicitly doesn't want patches in linux-next which haven't been acked, and security-next feeds into linux-next, so I don't want to ask James to take the patch without an ack :)
> Personally the user namespace only becomes interesting when we > start to be able to move in the other direction and remove the > set of capabilities requires to create it. > > Eric
Agreed. Now the thing is I don't think we need full userns support to get there. We just need the targeted capabilities and the basic dummy fs support - that is, init_user_ns owns all vfsmounts, and anyone not in init_user_ns only gets user other access to files under those mounts.
Of course complete support for targeted caps will in itself be a huge effort :)
So my roadmap is: next address the per-user keyring, then the targeted caps.
-serge
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