Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 9 Oct 2008 20:45:52 +0200 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH 0a/3] TXT: Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technologysupport for Linux - Overview |
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> > > > You exit/reenter the trusted mode accross sleep... so any > guarantees > > > > "trusted" mode does are void, right? > > > > > > You exit from kernel to tboot on any shutdown, which handles the > proper > > > teardown of the measured env (meaning you also come back on via > tboot). > > > So things like saving tpm state, scrubbing secrets from memory, etc. > > > > Aha, so instead sleep mode is useless because I'll have to remount all > > the crypto filesystems and restart all the apps... > > Sleep mode works the same as it does today (caveat S4 issue which we > will fix), it just goes through the tboot code before putting the > platform HW into the appropriate state. What this process is adding is > that on resume, tboot will get control from BIOS instead of the kernel. > Then tboot will re-launch the TXT environment before going back to the > kernel at the kernel's expected S3 resume vector. The re-establishing > of the protected environment won't disrupt the subsequent kernel resume > process.
No, I don't get it. So presumably useful thing to do is to seal my crypto partition so that only known-good kernel can access it?
But then, the crypto keys will be in ram during suspend/resume (because I have the filesystem mounted) => I loose any guarantees?
Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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